7.
Putrabali (1:12-cv-24174-KMW) ("Castillo Bozo").
10.

Commisa: Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v.
Pemex-Exploración y Producción, District Court of the United States, South New
York's District, 27 August 2013 (1:10-cv-00206-AKH) ("Commisa").
Based on their analysis, the cases can be (generally) classified in three baskets: (a) those enforcing in accordance with domestic law, (b) those ignoring the annulment decision, and (c) those which assess the annulment decision in order to determine if it deserves deference. I shall summarize each.
A. ENFORCEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOMESTIC LAW
The cases
According to the French view, arbitral awards are "decisions hailing from international justice" and hence may be enforced in France in accordance with Norsolor is the first case tackling the issue. The French high Court faced an enforcement request of an award annulled by the Vienna Court of Appeals on the ground that the reasoning of the award was premised on lex mercatoria which, in the Vienna Court of Appeals' view, provoked lack of certainty. In quashing the decision of the Paris Court of Appeals denying enforcement, the Cour de Cassation held that upholding it would be contrary to claimant's right to enforce an arbitral award based on French law (the country where enforcement was requested), in accordance with
Article VII of the Convention.
Hilmarton follows the same ratio. Confronted with an arbitral award and a Swiss decision annulling it, the Cour de Cassation held that enforcement in France was feasible since (i) the arbitral award was not a decision 'integrated in Switzerland's legal order'; (ii) Article VII of New York Convention allows it to ignore ("écartée") the annulment decision (pursuant to Article V(1)(e) of the Convention) when the law of the country where the enforcement is sought allows enforcement; and (iii) France's public policy was unaffected. In its words: 3 … the Swiss award is an international decision that is not incorporated in the legal order of said State. Its existence continues regardless of its annulment given that its enforcement in France is not contrary to international public policy;
… it follows from article 7 of the New York Convention … that the judge may not deny enforcement of a foreign award when its national law so authorizes; that article 5-1, e, of the Convention, which establishes that the refusal of enforcement of an award annulled in its country of origin may be excluded when the law of the country where enforcement is sought allows for enforcement; that in this case the annulment of an award issued in Geneva does not constitute a displacement of the French international arbitration rule permitting enforcement of the award in France; that the 3 Hilmarton, p. 3. My translation of: "la sentence Suisse était une sentence internationale qui n'était pas intégrée dans l'ordre juridique de cet Etat, de sorte que son existence demeurait établie malgré son annulation et que sa reconnaissance en France n'etait pas contraire á l'ordre public international; …il résulte de l'article 7 de la Convention de NEW-YORK … que le juge ne peut refuser l'exequatur d'une sentence étrangère lorsque son droit nacional l'autorise; que des lors, les dispositions de l'article 5-1, e, de la Convention, qui prevoient le refus d'exequatur d'une sentence annulée dans son pays d'origine, doivent être écartées lorsque le droit du pays ou l'execution de la sentence est requise permet cette exécution; qu'en l'espèce, l'annulation de la sentence rendue à GENEVE ne constitue pas, aux termes de l'article 1502 du Nouveau Code de procedure civile, un cas de refus des régles françaises de l'arbitrage International pour demander l'exequatur en France de la sentence; d'une sentence rendue en matière d'arbitrage International, annulée à l'étranger par application de la loi locale, n'est pas contraire à l'ordre public international" (Hilmarton, p. 3).
enforcement of an award annulled abroad further to domestic law is not contrary to international public policy…
In Putrabali the reasoning further to which an award annulled abroad was enforced was premised on the international character of the award, characterizing it as a "decision of international justice" ("décision de justice internationale"). And in accordance with French law, the annulment decision issued by another country is not a sufficient reason to deny the enforcement of an award. In the words of the Cour de Cassation: 4 Given that the international award, which is not linked to the legal order of a state, is a decision of international justice, which regularity is examined with regard to the rules applicable in the country where its recognition and enforcement are sought; that further to Article VII of the New York Convention of 10 January 1958 Rena Holding had the right to submit in France the award issued in London on 10 April 2001, in accordance with the arbitration convention, and with the rules of IGPA, it is possible to avail itself of the provisions of French international arbitration law, which do not provide for the annulment of the award in its place of origin as a ground to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award issued abroad.
Comment
The gist of the reasoning of the three summarized is as follows:
(a) The characterization of awards as hailing from international justice; French courts look to their domestic law so as to assess if, according to it, an annulled award may be enforced. If no reason is found not to enforce, they enforce it. And in doing so, they emphasize that the foreign annulment decision has force within a foreign legal system, not the French legal system. Therefore, when faced with two competing decisions ⎯an award and a decision annulling it⎯ they choose to enforce the award, absent a countervailing reason hailing from domestic law.
This vision not only has technical merit, but fosters a praiseworthy result.
The merit consists in the skill with which the New York Convention is conceived and handled: it is conceived as an "open" instrument that acts as a de minimis statute, a 'floor' so to speak, further to which awards may be enforced. But should another more favorable law apply, it shall be further to the latter that the award will be enforced.
The plausible result has to do with the fact that a creditor further to an arbitral award is construed to have such right as a result of an internationally accepted dispute resolution mechanism, which may be given effects by virtue of both the international and domestic legal systems. Viewed thus, the plurality of systems are mutuallyreinforcing methods of ensuring that rights flowing from arbitral awards will be made effective.
B. IGNORING THE ANNULMENT DECISION
Cases exist where the analysis followed is twofold: (i) the annulment decision is ignored; and (ii) the focus is the content of the award.
The cases
In Karaha Bodas, an award annulled in Jakarta, Indonesia, was enforced in Texas given that the annulment decision did not come from the seat or "primary jurisdiction" (a term coined by said court of appeals). 5 Switzerland was the seat of the award.
Arguing that the award was done 'in accordance' with Indonesian law, Pertamina advanced that two seats existed: Switzerland and Jakarta. Therefore, the annulment decision had to be respected: it flowed from a ⎯if not the⎯ seat. The Texas court of appeals decided that the real seat was Switzerland. 6 Since the annulment did not hail from Switzerland, the ground contained in Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention was not satisfied, and therefore enforced the award.
In Castillo Bozo, the District Court performed a three-step analysis. First, it decided to ignore the annulment decision due to the fact that it did not come from the seat, 7 reasoning that:
The Court finds that the Venezuelan annulment order at issue in this case does not qualify as a judgment of a ''competent court,'' and thus should not be afforded comity
It then analyzed the reasons for annulment and concluded that no such reasons were extant. Finally, she analyzed if the enforcement would breach her public policy-and concluded that:
the Court finds that recognition of the arbitral decision will not violate the public policy of the United States, and thus the Court does not have grounds to refuse to recognize the arbitration award under Art. 5(2)(b) of the Convention.
In Yukos the Amsterdam's Court of Appeals decided to enforce the award annulled in Moscow considering that: 8 5 A digression is apposite. Referring to the seat as the "primary jurisdiction" invites confusion. Although in a manner it facilitates explanation, it invites a subconscious assumption that may cause analytical mischief: that one jurisdiction has supremacy over another. There is no such supremacy in the regime of the New York Convention. The "secondary jurisdiction" is not 'secondary' in importance. It is a jurisdiction just like any other, including the law of the seat.
6
Not only because the reference to the applicable law did not entail the domestic arbitration law, but also because Pertamina requested (without success) the annulment in Switzerland.
… the New York Convention 1958 otherwise leaves scope for granting leave to enforce an arbitral award that has been set aside by a competent authority of the country where the award was granted, the Dutch court is in any rate not compelled to refuse the leave to enforce a set aside arbitral award if the foreign judgment under which the arbitral award was set aside, cannot be recognized in the Netherlands. This particularly applies if the manner in which said judgment was brought about does not satisfy the principles of due process and for that reason recognition of the judgment would lead to a conflict with Dutch public order.
It framed the issue thus: 9
Whether the decision of the Russian Civil Court to set aside the arbitral award can be recognized in the Netherlands, more in particular whether said judgments were rendered by a judicial instance that is impartial and independent.
Considering (a) the (sic) "close interwovenness" of Rosneft and the State of Russia;
(b) the several international indicators which referred to (i) the lack of independence of the Russian judiciary, (ii) the fact that the judiciary receives instructions from the executive, 10 (iii) that the judiciary is used by the executive as a political instrument;
and (c) that partiality and dependency by their nature occur 'behind the scenes'; the Amsterdam Court of Appeals concluded that it is plausible that the award-annulment decision of the Russian Civil Court came from a partial process which lacked independence. Therefore, it did not deserve to be recognized in the Netherlands. 11
Hence, when assessing Yukos Capital's request to enforce the arbitral award, the annulment decisions were ignored.
Comment
Although in the same basket, I must avow that the cases are analytically distinguishable. Whilst Karaha Bodas and Castillo Bozo ignored the annulment decision given that they did not hail from the seat, Yukos ignored it because it questioned the Id., ¶3.9.
10
A phenomenon known as "supine pozvonochnost": judicial decisions are said to follow telephone instructions from the executive ("zvonok").
11
Id., ¶3.9. C. DEFERENCE ANALYSIS
The cases
Cases exist where the exercise followed involved assessing the quality of the annulment decision in order to decide whether it deserves 'deference'. If the answer is positive, enforcement is denied. If it does not, enforcement is ordered.
In Baker Marine the enforcement of an arbitral award annulled at the seat (Nigeria) was denied reasoning that, if the award was made in Nigeria, in accordance with Nigerian law, including arbitration law, the fact that a Nigerian court annulled it is sufficient to refuse enforcement in the United States. When arriving at said conclusion, it made two observations that display a deference analysis: 13 … Baker Marine has made no contention that the Nigerian courts acted contrary to Nigerian law. It is sufficient answer that Baker Marine has shown no adequate reasons for refusing to recognize the judgments of the Nigerian Court…
Ad contrario -one surmises-had there been statements or evidence that the Nigerian courts acted in a manner contrary to their law, or 'sufficient reasons' to deny recognition of the annulment decisions, the New York court would have enforced.
In Chromalloy an award annulled in Cairo was enforced in the United States.
When deciding on the subject, the District Court performed a two-step analysis. First, 12 This strand of reasoning could warrant considering the decision in the third basket (See §C, infra). The Consejo de Estado, Colombia's highest administrative court, is the final expositor of Colombian law, and we are in no position to pronounce the decision of that court wrong.
As a result, the enforcement of the arbitral award was denied, for it had been annulled at the seat.
Recently, in Commisa, 19 the District Court commenced by posing the question as follows: when confronted with an award and a decision annulling it, which one should prevail? 20 It concluded that, 21 given the circumstances, the decision did not deserve deference: 22 I hold … that the Eleventh Collegiate Court decision violated basic notions of justice in that it applied a law that was not in existence at the time the parties' contract was formed and left COMMISA without an apparent ability to litigate its claims. I therefore decline to defer to the Eleventh Collegiate Court's ruling, and I again confirm the Award and grant judgment thereon.
The premise behind the conclusion was retroactivity. An (alleged) ex post facto application of a statute. As a consequence, it declined to defer to said decision for, in its opinion: 23
The decision … violated basic notions of justice, … I hold that the Award in favor of COMMISA should be confirmed.
To reach said conclusion it analyzed the content of the annulment decision. Commisa, p. 1, first paragraph.
21
The analysis followed raises the question whether the decision was an expression of principle or a solution based on the particular circumstances of the case. I find that … the decision vacating the Award violated "basic notions of justice", and that deference is therefore not required.
As a result, the request to "confirm the award" was granted. Appeal is pending as of the date of this essay.
Comment
The United States' solution to the problem of the possibility to enforce annulled awards involves analyzing the annulment decision in order to determine if it deserves 
II. IS THERE A BETTER APPROACH?
The three views canvassed above not only involve different ways to solve a dilemma which has, for some time now, occupied the minds of salient experts, but also reflect solutions displaying different analytical rigor, causing different consequences, both positive and negative.
Whilst the impact of the deference analysis is that one judiciary passes judgment over another, disregarding the annulment decision it the equivalent of closing ones eyes before reality. Even worse, ignoring the express text of the New York Convention:
an award may be refused enforcement when annulled. 28 On the other hand, the 26 And some jurisdictions are in the process of crafting their standard.
27
Given that, at the time of writing, the case was under appeal, the impact of the decision in the (currently fluid) standard of the Second Circuit is to be seen. As is known, it is not the courts of first instance which create precedents, but the higher courts when they accept, rejecting or qualify the reasoning of lower courts. We need to accept it: the deference analysis is suboptimal.
On the other hand, the cases ignoring the annulment decision are questionable in that they fail to comply with the New York Convention. I would not be surprised if some alleged that they have violated the New York Convention. In my opinion, the conclusion is not forced: the chapeau of Article V contains a verb providing for discretion ("may"). 31 But the solution which simply ignores the annulment decision ⎯which satisfies the hypothesis contained in article V (1) accordance with this view, domestic law is conceived as one piece -one more gearof the (complex) international system which effect is to facilitate the resolution of international disputes. Understood thus, the effect will be that a creditor under an arbitral award may trust the international system as a whole to have its rights respected. If a piece becomes clogged or stuck, others will assist. The international engine will not become wrecked should one of the pistons be inadequately oiled.
And given that nobody passes judgment on anybody, no offended parties (judiciaries) will exist. 35 32 I would not be surprised if, instead of judged, some feel the judiciary was insulted.
33
I am open to views as to the merits of the French view in itself, a matter I would be delighted to hear from expert colleagues. My point in this paper is not that the view is in and of itself perfect, but that it is the better from those extant.
34
To echo the term coined by Emmanuel Gaillard in ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT DE L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL, Academie de droit internationald de la Haye, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008. 35 My concern regarding this regard is not due to thin skin. It stems from understanding that nothing is gained by insulting a neighbor, particularly a commercial partner. And on the other hand the good will and disposition to cooperate may be lessened. And if a legal text allows for both interpretations, why not favor choosing the analytical solution avoiding problems, rather than that inflaming them?
